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A national security tool is supposed to be able to support national security. It is this premise that makes
the alleged, attempted assassination of a Hamas leader, Khaled Mashaal, by Israeli agents of the Mossad
controversial to so many diplomats, government officials, and political and intelligence authorities
throughout the world. Although there are many arguments that can be made by opponents of the
alleged attempted assassination, the conclusion of virtually all these argument is that Israeli security
would not have been supported whether Mashaal was assassinated or not.
These arguments suggest that--either way--Israel would have garnered its resultant political problems
with Jordan, the Palestinian National Authority, Hamas, and the United States among others. However
these arguments are based on the source of the successful or unsuccessful assassination becoming
known. If the clandestine and covert nature of an assassination attempt were successfully protected,
these arguments can be successfully refuted. The death of a political leader in Jordan can reasonably be
attributed to intrafactional or interfactional conflict, bad health, "nonpolitical" crime, mistaken identity,
being in the wrong place at the wrong time, and so on.
An opponent may certainly advance arguments that assassination violates moral and ethical standards
or that gentlemen don't read each other's mail and kill each other. However, in the case of Khaled
Mashaal, making political objections more likely masks conflicts of power between the Netanyahu
administration and its domestic and foreign opponents. (See Amon, M. (1996). Cultural clues: The
nature of intelligence after Rabin's assassination. Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 9, 115; deMause, L. (1995). Shooting at Clinton, prosecuting O.J., and other sacrificial rituals. Journal of
Psychohistory, 22, 378-393; Indinopulos, T. (1997). Shin Bet's blind side. International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 10, 91-96; Schemann, S. (October 7, 1997.) Netanyahu remains
defiant on botched assassination attempt. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com.) (Keywords:
National Security, Assassination, Israel, Mossad.)
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